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The Conundrum of Common
Ownership
Jennifer G. Hill*
ABSTRACT

The common ownership debate has become one of the most
contentious issues in corporate law today. This debate is a by-

product of major changes to capital market ownership structure,
which have triggered concerns about the rise of institutional
investors, the growth of index investing, and the rapid
concentration of ownership in major international financial

markets.
The common ownership theory focuses on concerns about the

incentives of large financial institutions holding widely
diversified portfolios of shares in competing companies within a
particulareconomic sector. Proponentsof the common ownership
theory argue that, even where institutional investors have

relatively small ownership stakes, their collective holdings in
competing companies produce anticompetitive effects. Other
scholars, however, have challenged both the common ownership
theory and its regulatory prescriptions. Although the common
ownership theory began in the United States, it is now being
discussed around the world.
This Article examines three conflicting narratives that

emerge in this literature concerning institutional investors and
the common ownership theory. The Article seeks to position these
narratives within the context of the rising influence of

institutional investors since the early 1990s and its relation to
major international corporate governance developments. It
analyzes aspects of the common ownership theory in light of these

&
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contemporary corporate governance developments and argues
that drawing regulatory and policy conclusions from the current

body of conflicting empirical findings on the effects of common
ownership is premature.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.
III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION ... ............................ .........................
882
LAW'S DISCOVERY OF AN "ECONOMIC
BLOCKBUSTER" .........
.......... ........................
884
THREE POSSIBLE NARRATIVES CONCERNING COMMON
OWNERSHIP ............................
.....
. .............. 888
THE THEORY OF COMMON OWNERSHIP FROM A CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE............... ..............
894

A.

Common Ownership Is a Controversial

B.

and Broad-Brush Theory.................
The Common Ownership Theory

895

Includes Some Questionable Underlying
Presumptions.......................................

C.

Recognition of the Link Between

D.

Antitrust Law Is Not New .......
..........
Common Ownership Is a US-Centric
and Industry-Specific Debate.. ..........

896

Concentrated Ownership and

B.
F.
G.
V.

Common Ownership in
Megacompanies ...................................
Investee Firm Managers and Their
Fiduciary Duties . ......... .......
.

Institutional Investors and the Growing
Importance of ESG..............................

CONCLUSION...... ...

.................

...........

...

898
899
901
. 903

904
906

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most contentious issues in corporate law today is the

common ownership debate. This debate is a by-product of major
changes to capital market structure over the last few decades. It
reflects concern about the rise of institutional investors, the growth of
index investing, and increasing ownership concentration in financial

markets.1

1.
See, e.g., Eric Posner et al., A Monopoly Trump Can Pop, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2016, at A29; Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Mutual Funds'Dark Side: Why Airlines and
Other Industries Keep Prices Too High, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2015), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2015/04/mutual-funds-make-air-travel-more-expensive-institutional-
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"Common ownership" (which is sometimes used synonymously
"overlapping
or
shareholding"
"horizontal
terms
the
with
2
financial
large
where
the
situation
describes
shareholding")
competing
in
shares
own
portfolios
diversified
widely
with
institutions
3
companies within a particular economic sector. A number of scholars
(described in this Article as "anti-common ownership scholars") have
argued that, even where these institutions have relatively small
ownership stakes, their collective holdings in competing companies
produce anticompetitive effects in a range of corporate governance
4
contexts, such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and executive
compensation. 5 The basis for this claim is that, in such circumstances,
the institutions are interested in the financial performance of their
portfolios as a whole, rather than the performance of individual
companies in that sector.6
Although the common ownership debate began in the United
States, it is now attracting attention around the world.7 For example,
European intergovernmental and regulatory organizations have
focused on the debate 8 which also has clear relevance to certain
9
jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific region. This is particularly true of
of
size
large
and
role
distinctive
the
given
Australia,

investors-reduce-competition.html [https://perma.cc/8GCS-8W6E] (archived Feb. 10,
2020).
Cf. Einer Elhauge, New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal
2.
Shareholding 4-6 (Jan. 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN)
[hereinafter Elhauge, New Evidence].
See, e.g., Jose Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73
3.
J. FIN. 1513, 1514 (2018).
See, e.g., Miguel Anton et al., Does Common Ownership Increase Incentives
4.
for Mergers and Acquisitions?, 2 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, ANTITRUST CHRON. (2019);
Miguel Anton et al., Beyond the Target: M&A Decisions and Rival Ownership (Jan. 19,
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN).
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our Economy
5.
And Why Antitrust Law Can Fix It, HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript
at 8-9) (on file with author) [hereinafter Elhauge, Antitrust Law].
6.
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267,
1268 (2016) (describing lessened effects of individual companies' performance)
[hereinafter Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding];Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1514.
See Brooke Fox & Robin Wigglesworth, Common Ownership of Shares Faces
7.
Regulatory Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/59325462fe57-11e8-aebf-99e208d3e521 [https://perma.ce/CNH4-X688] (archived Mar. 16, 2020).
See generally Competition Division, Common Ownership by Institutional
8.
Investors and its Impact on Competition, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv. 10 (Dec.
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2017)10/en/pdf
2017),
5-6,
[https://perma.cc/4JU5-UPHE]
(archived Feb. 22, 2020); MONOPOLKOMMISsION,
Common Ownership: Excerpt from Ch II of the XXII Biennial Report of the Monopolies
(2018),
Commission

https://www.monopolkommission.de/images/HG22/MainReportXXII

Common Owner

ship.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EQ4-BX2K] (archived Feb. 10, 2020).
See, e.g., Ben Charoenwong, The Cost of Common Ownership to the Singapore
9.
Government, MEDIUM: THE STARTUP (May 20, 2019), https://medium.com/swlh/the-costof-common-ownership-to-the-singapore-government-f6b519b567eb
[https://perma.cc/LK79-HJ2C] (archived Feb. 10, 2020).

884

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:881

superannuation/pension funds in Australian capital markets' and the
concentration of certain industries, such as the banking and finance

sector 11
The aim of this Article is to contextualize the common ownership
theory within a broad range of international corporate governance
developments relating to institutional investment since the early

1990s. The structure of the Article is as follows. Part II discusses the
impact on legal scholarship of the common ownership theory, which
commenced in the field of financial economics. Part III examines three
possible narratives that exist in the literature relating to institutional
investors and common ownership. Part IV analyzes certain aspects of
the common ownership theory in the light of contemporary corporate
governance developments and debate, and Part V concludes the Article
and argues that drawing regulatory and policy conclusions from
current mixed empirical evidence is premature.

II. LAW'S DISCOVERY OF AN "ECONOMIC BLOCKBUSTER"
At the turn of the twenty-first century, a team of financial
economists, Professor Rafael La Porta et al., postulated that "law
matters" when it comes to the structure of capital markets. 1 2 The
hypothesis claimed that jurisdictions with high levels of legal
protection for minority shareholders would develop deep liquid capital
markets like those in the United States and the United Kingdom.13
The "law matters" hypothesis had significant policy implications for
regulation and law reform 4 and proved highly influential in both

economics and law. 15

10. See generally Rob Nichols & Deniz Kayis, Common Corporate Owners,
Concerted Corporate Actions? (Working Paper, 2019),
11.
See Jennifer G. Hill, Why Did Australia FareSo Well in the Global Financial
Crisis?, in THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRIsIS 203, 291-92
(Eilis Ferran et al., 2012).
12.
See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. EcON. 1113,
1116 (1998) (describing effects of different legal regimes on financial markets); Rafael La
Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FINANCE 471, 472 (1999)
(stating that countries with more legal protections provide more security for minority
shareholders).
13.
Id.
14.
The "law matters" hypothesis also had strong normative overtones, viewing
the legal protections offered by common law legal systems as superior to those found in
civil law legal systems. See David A. Skeel Jnr, CorporateAnatomy Lessons, 113 YALE
L.J. 1519, 1544-45 (2004).
15.
See, e.g., Steve Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, How "Law and Finance"
Transformed Scholarship, Debate,
CHI.
BOOTH
REV.
(Mar.
5,
2014),
https://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/spring-2014/how-law-and-finance-

transformed-scholarship-debate [https://perma.c/DN4R-CQAR]
(archived Feb. 22,
2020). Nonetheless, many legal scholars were extremely critical of certain aspects of the
"law matters" hypothesis. For an overview of this criticism, see generally Jennifer G. Hill,
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Almost twenty years on, recent scholarship concerning common
ownership provides a strong counterpoint to the "law matters"
hypothesis in terms of its policy implications for capital market
regulation. According to anti-common ownership scholars, the
problem today is that fund flows to deep capital markets occur via a
small number of increasingly powerful financial intermediaries with

highly diversified portfolios.'6
Like the "law matters" hypothesis, the common ownership theory
originated in economic literature, but subsequently emerged in legal
scholarship, where it has had a major impact. In a high profile 2016
Harvard Law Review article, Professor Einer Elhauge described the
argument that common ownership has anticompetitive effects as a
recently exposed "economic blockbuster."" Anti-common ownership
scholars have referred to the rise of institutional investors as "[t]he
18
and "a
great, but mostly unknown, antitrust story of our time,"
9
gun."'
smoking
There have been major changes to capital market structure over
the last few decades, and these changes lie at the heart of the common
ownership theory. Today, the dominant shareholders of public
2
companies in many, but by no means all, 0 jurisdictions are
institutional intermediaries. The growth in financial intermediation in
savings and investment decisions was foreseen from at least the 1970s
2
by commentators, such as Peter Drucker ' and Professor Robert
Clark 2 2 As anti-common ownership scholars have noted, however,
financial intermediation investment channels are now highly
concentrated.2 3 The alleged culprits behind the common ownership
theory are major financial institutions, such as BlackRock, Vanguard,

The Persistent Debate About Convergence in Comparative Corporate Governance, 27
SYDNEY L. REV. 743 (2005).
See Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1514 n.2 (citing Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden
16.
Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership,
and New Financial Risk, 19 BuS. & POL. 298 (2017)).
See Riner Elhauge, The Growing Problem of Horizontal Shareholding, 3
17.
COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, ANTITRUST CHRON. 1 (2017) [hereinafter Elhauge, Growing
Problem]; Elhauge, New Evidence, supra note 2, at 1; Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding,
supra note 6, at 1267.
Posner et al., supra note 1; see also Eric Posner et al., A Proposal to Limit the
18.
Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669 (2017)
(arguing that the rise of the institutional investor is new to recent decades).

&

Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 1.
19.
India, for example, is a case in point. See George S, Geis, Shareholder Power
20.
in India, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF SHAREHOLDER PowER 592 (Jennifer G. Hill
Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (arguing that institutional investor power in India is
either static or dwindling).
See Peter F. Drucker, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION FUND
21.
SOcIALISM CAME To AMERICA 130 (1st ed. 1976).
22.
See Robert C. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment
Management Treatises, 94 HAEV. L. REV. 561, 561 (1981).
See Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1514 n.2.
23.
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and State Street Global Advisors.2 4 A frequently cited statistic is that
the combined holdings of these institutions (the so-called Big Three) 25
constitute the largest investment group in 88 percent of all S&P 500
firms,2 6 and this concentration is increasing.2 7
The common ownership theory is linked not only to institutional
investors but also to a particular type of investment-index
investing.2 8 There has been massive growth in index funds, including
both index-based mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), 2 9
which has led some commentators to ask whether index funds are
"eating the world."3 0 Index investing, which relies upon wide stock
performance diversification,3 1 has become the new default investment
option for major financial institutions. According to BlackRock, for
example, index investing is now a "cornerstone" of modern investment
practice.32

24.
See Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 6, at 1268; see also Jan
Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? PassiveIndex Funds, Re-Concentration
of Corporate Ownership, and New FinancialRisk, 19 Bus. & POL. 298, 298 (2017).
25.
See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 119 CoLUM. L. REV, 2029, 2033 (2019);
Fichtner et al., supra note 24, at 298.
26.
See Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1514 n.2.
27.
It has been predicted that, by 2024, index funds will hold more than 50% of
the US stock market. Jill Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical
Frameworkfor Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 20 (2019)
28.
See, e.g., Index Investing and Common Ownership Theories, BLACKRoCK
2017),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint(Mar.
index-investing-and-common-ownership-theories-eng-march.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TTH-X3HE] (archived Feb. 10, 2020) [hereinafter BLACKROCK];
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 25.
29.
At the end of 2017, assets of US mutual funds and exchange traded funds
(ETFs) totaled over $18 trillion, compared with $5.5 trillion nine years earlier. See
Timothy Strauts, 5 Chartson U.S. FundFlows That Show the Shift to Passive Investing,
MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.morningstar.com/blog/2018/03/12/fundflows-charts.html [https://perma.cc/MHD8-6KPK] (archived Feb. 10, 2020).
30.
Jason Zweig, Are Index Funds Eating the World?, WALL ST. J.: THE
INTELLIGENT

INVESTOR

(Aug.

26,

2016),

https:/Iblogs.ws .com/moneyheat/2016/08/26/are-index-funds-eating-the-world/
[https://perma.ce/6SA4-6DXS] (archived Feb. 10, 2020). See also Louis Navellier, The
Index Monster That Ate the Stock Market, SEEKING ALPHA (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4004842-index-monster-ate-stock-market
[https://perma.c/76HM-M7DG] (archived Apr. 7, 2020).
31.
See BLAcKRoCK, supra note 28, at 4.
32.
Id. at 1. See also Sarah Krouse et al., Meet the New CorporatePower Brokers:
Passive Investors, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-newcorporate-power-brokers-passive-investors-1477320101 [https://perma.cc/JT5E-LGHM]
(archived Feb. 10, 2020); Fisch et al., supra note 27, at 17.
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Index funds, which have been described as "autopilot portfolios," 3 3
35
track stock indices3 4 rather than attempting to beat the market. They
feature prominently in the literature discussing common ownership;
however, it is important to note the implications of the common
ownership theory are, in fact, far broader than this form of investing
36
and also include actively managed funds.
In contrast to the "law matters" hypothesis, which regarded deep
capital markets propelled by institutional investment as a desirable
corporate governance outcome, anti-common ownership scholars view
this form of diversified shareholding across concentrated product
markets as deeply problematic.37 They claim that there is empirical
evidence to show that common ownership results in reduced
38
The
competition and higher consumer prices in certain sectors.
sectors targeted for academic scrutiny to date are the technology,
39
An influential
airline, banking, and pharmaceutical industries.
economics paper by Professor Jose Azar et al., for example, claims that
common ownership by the largest institutional investors in the US
airline sector resulted in reduced competition and higher airline ticket
prices for customers.4 0 Yet, according to Elhauge, the industries
identified so far are merely the tip of the iceberg, and numerous other
sectors are equally "plagued" by common ownership.41
Anti-common ownership scholars warn that the growth of
42
shareholder diversification could have a variety of dire consequences,
43
potentially undermining the entire economy, with harmful effects on

Zweig, supra note 30.
33.
See Gabriel Rauterherg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise
34.
and Failureof Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 1 (2013); Adriana Z. Robertson,
Passive in Name Only: DelegatedManagement and "Index" Investing, 36 YALE J. ON REG'.
795, 797 (2019) (for discussion of the nature of securities indices, which underpin index
investing).
See BLACKROCK, supra note 28, at 1 (for a description of modern index
35.
investing practice).
Id.; Elhauge, New Evidence, supra note 2, at 27.
36.
37.
See Frank Partnoy, Are Index Funds Evil?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/are-index-funds-evil/534183/
[https://perma.ccLTN9-LTVH 3(archived Feb. 10, 2020).
Id.
38.
See, e.g., Jos6 Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (May
39.
4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN) [hereinafter Azar et al, Ultimate
Ownership] (banking and finance); Yesha Yadav, Common Agency in Bank Regulation
(2018) (unpublished presentation) (on file in the UC Berkeley Law Library Catalog);
Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1513 (airline industry).
40.
Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1513.
41.
Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding; supra note 6, at 1268; see also Elhauge,
Growing Problem, supra note 17, at 1-2.
42.
See, e.g.. Bebchuk & Hirst supra note 25, at 2133 (describing such warnings
as "alarmism over common ownership").
See Elhauge, Antitrust Law, supra note 5, at 1.
43.
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consumer welfare and equality,4 4 employment and wages, 45 and
society as a whole. 4 6 The regulatory solutions suggested by some
scholars to the supposed problems of the growth of institutional
investors and common ownership are suitably Draconian.4 7 They

include depriving index funds of their voting rights;4 8 restricting
institutional investor share ownership to no more than one company
in an oligarchy; and allowing institutional investors to hold shares in
competing companies, only if those holdings do not exceed 1 percent,
with forced divestiture in the case of noncompliance. 4 9

III. THREE POSSIBLE NARRATIVES CONCERNING COMMON OWNERSHIP
At least three possible narratives might be derived from increased
portfolio diversification by institutional investors, which is frequently
in the form of common ownership across the same industry.
Scholarship concerning the phenomenon of common ownership often
shifts between these narratives, without necessarily specifying which
version it is addressing. 5 0

44.
See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 37 (stating that "[u]ltimately, the new theory of
common ownership is a theory about inequality: To the extent that passive investing
shifts costs to consumers, it makes the rich richer, and the poor poorer."); see also
Elhauge, Growing Problem, supra note 17, at 10; Posner & Weyl supra note 1.
45.
Anti-common ownership literature also raises the issue of inequality, not only
hetween shareholders and consumers, but also between shareholders and employees.
See, e.g., Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 6, at 1292-93; Elhauge, New
Evidence, supra note 2, at 15-16; Elhauge, Antitrust Law, supra note 5, at 11 (claiming
that common ownership advantages shareholders, who are "disproportionatelywealthy"
and "depresses employment and wages in a way that further disproportionately harms
the non-wealthy").
See, e.g., Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership, supra note 39, at 35
46.
("[u]nfortunately, the benefits to shareholders from diversification and good governance
may come at a cost to consumers: efficient capital markets with perfect diversification
and "good governance" imply deadweight losses in input and output markets") (an earlier
version of this article argued that diversification and good governance harmed "society
at large"); see also Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J.
CORP. L. 493, 494 (2018) (arguing that the likely result of index investing is serious
economic harm); Elhauge, New Evidence, supra note 2, at 26 (arguing that "enormous
harm" of this kind is already occurring as a result of common ownership).
See Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Defusing the Antitrust Threat to
47.
Institutional Involvement in Corporate Governance 24-27 (Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series Working Paper No. 17-05, 2017) (outlining the various solutions to what the
authors regard as a "non-problem").
48.
Lund, supra note 46, at 497.
49.
See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 47, at 26.
50.
See generally Lund, supra note 46. At times, Professor Lund argues that
"passive"index investors lack the financial incentive to monitor their portfolio companies
to ensure that they are managed effectively, which appears to be a variant of Version 1
below. Id. at 495, 511, 512. She also argues, however, that these investors will
"increasingly influence and even control the outcome of shareholder interventions",
which suggests either Version 2 or Version 3 below. Id. at 493.

2020]

THE CONUNDRUM OFCOMMMON OWNERSHIP

889

Version 1, which might be labelled "the lazy investor narrative,"
focuses on the general incentives and behavior of fund managers. The
argument here is that portfolio diversification, particularly across
companies in the same economic sector, may result in perverse or
inadequate incentives for institutional investors to engage in strong
monitoring. 51 This narrative suggests that, particularly from a costbenefit analysis, it may not make sense for fund managers to adopt a
private investor/owner-like stance toward individual companies in a
widely diversified portfolio5 2 and that rational apathy will therefore

prevail. 53
This narrative assumes that lack of interest by institutional
investors in the performance of individual portfolio firms will be
harmful to the company's performance. It suggests that lazy investors
inevitably breed lazy managers, 54 whose desire to enjoy "the quiet
life"5 5 will override their responsibilities to the company and its
shareholders. In this narrative, lack of attention by institutional
investors enables the portfolio firm's managers to call the shots in favor
of their own preferences and self-interest.
This was a familiar part of the so-called passivity story of the
1990s, 5 6 The underlying presumption in corporate governance
literature during this period was that monitoring by institutional
investors is a positive feature of corporate governance, and
nonparticipation by such investors is a corporate governance problem
in need of a solution. 5 7 Academic literature during the 1990s sought to

See, e.g., Edward Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in
51.
THE OXFORD HANDBoOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 363, 373-74 (Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018); Jill Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It
Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. 1009, 1009 (1994); see also I3ebchuk & Hirst,
supra note 25, at 2075 (discussing a range of disincentives for index funds to invest
adequately in stewardship or to challenge corporate management).
See Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism:Investor Capitalism?, 22 U.
52.
MicH. J.L. REFORM 117, 146-48 (1988).
53. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional ShareholderActivism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 473-74 (1991).
See, e.g., Azar et al,, supra note 3 (suggesting that failure by institutional
54.
investors to demand or provide incentives for greater competition between portfolio firms
may allow managers of those firms "to enjoy the 'quiet life"'); Azar et al., Ultimate
Ownership, supra note 39, at 5.
55. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhill Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life?
CorporateGovernance and ManagerialPreferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1043 (2003);
Elhauge, Growing Problem, supra note 17, at 5 (stating that "because competing
vigorously is hard work for managers, they are less likely to do it unless their
shareholders are actively pressing them to compete").

56. Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
522 (1990) [hereinafter Black, ShareholderPassivity].
See e.g., G.P. Stapledon, Disincentives to Activism by Institutional Investors
57.
in Listed Australian Companies, 18 SYDNEY L. REV. 152, 154, 165 (1996); Bernard S.
Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of InstitutionalInvestor Voice, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 811, 821 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents Watching Agents]; Conard, supra note
52.
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find ways to overcome the legal and economic barriers to greater
institutional investor engagement in corporate governance. 5 8

Recent articles, by Professor Dorothy Lund and Professors Lucian
Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, represent modern incarnations of this
narrative. 59 Lund, for example, has argued within this paradigm that
index funds are quintessentially passive and ignorant investors, with
inadequate incentives to monitor management. 60 Bebchuk and Hirst
are also concerned that index fund managers have incentives to
underinvest in stewardship and to be overly deferential to the
managers of portfolio companies. 61
Yet, although the articles by these scholars reveal similar
concerns, their regulatory prescriptions are quite different. Lund
effectively adopts a punitive approach, arguing that index funds, as
innately lazy investors, should therefore be deprived of their voting
rights.6 2 Bebchuk and Hirst, on the other hand, are more sanguine,
suggesting reforms to counteract current incentives that nudge index
fund managers toward passivity.6 3 Their goal is to make index fund
voting better informed and meaningful. 64
Bebchuk and Hirst's approach is consistent with the policy goals
in many parts of the world, where the aim is to increase, not decrease,
corporate governance engagement by institutional investors, including
index funds. 65 Lund's proposal, however, directly conflicts with those
policy goals.6 6 Furthermore, discrimination of the kind advocated by
Lund could be unlawful in jurisdictions where a one-vote-per-share
policy prevails. 6 7 It is interesting to note, for example, that, in
Australia, an attempt to alter the corporate constitution of a company
to disenfranchise institutional investors was struck down by the court

58.
Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 57, 830-35; Black, Shareholder
Passivity, supra note 56, at 521.
59.
See generally Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 25; Lund, supra note 46.
60.
Lund, supra note 46, at 512-13. See also Bill Ackman, Capitalism's Unlikely
Heroes: Why Activist Investors are Good for the Public Company, ECONoMIST (Feb. 5,
2015),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/02/05/capitalisms-unlikely-heroes
[https://perma.ce/33HX-Q5XY] (archived Feb. 10 2020). Cf. Elhauge, New Evidence,
supra note 2, at 3.
61.
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 25, 2035, 2050, 2059.
62.
Lund, supranote 46, at 528-30, 536.
63.
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 25, at 2118.
64.
Id.
See generally Jennifer G. Hill, The Trajectory of American Corporate
65.
Governance: Shareholder Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat, 2019 U. ILL. L.
REV. 507 (2019) [hereinafter Hill, Trajectory]; Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index
Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences of Active Investing, 55 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 803 (2018).
66.
See generally Lund, supra note 46.
67.
See, e.g., Douglas Appell, 'One Share, One Vote' Remains Gold Standard
Despite
Challenges,
PENSIONS
&
INVESTMENTS
(Aug.
7.
2017),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170807/PRINT/170809923/one-share-one-vote-

remains-gold-standard-despite-challenges
Mar. 16, 2020).

[https://perma.cc/3APZ-SQKT]

(archived
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on the basis that such inherent discrimination between different
68
shareholder groups constituted fraud on the minority.
Versions 2 and 3 of the possible common ownership narratives
differ significantly from Version 1. Whereas Version 1 raises concerns
about lack of engagement by institutional investors, Version 2 suggests
that they are too involved in corporate governance. Also, whereas
Version 1 focuses on the danger of uncontrolled power by corporate
managers, Versions 2 and 3 are underpinned by concern about the
behavior and/or power of institutional investors themselves.
According to Version 2, which might be described as "the

anticompetitive pressure model," where common ownership occurs
across the same economic sector, institutional investors will have
skewed incentives, leading them to abuse their ownership rights by

pressuring managers of investee firms to act in an anticompetitive or
collusive fashion. This narrative would seem to suggest that common
ownership involves situations where institutional investors pressure
managers of investee companies to engage in anticompetitive

conduct.6 9

This interpretation of Version 2 appears to require active conduct
by institutional investors to subvert competition between portfolio
companies in the same sector. Such an interpretation accords with
Professor Richard Buxbaum's suggestion almost twenty years ago that
may be easier to accept than an active
"a totally passive investor ...

one" 70

At first sight, this interpretation of Version 2 would seem to
exclude index funds on the basis that they are passive investors only.

Nonetheless, there is a broader interpretation of Version 2, which is
capable of including index funds, by challenging the accuracy of their
depiction as "passive investors." 7 1 It has been argued, for example,
that, although index investors cannot vote on, or influence, the

68.
See Australian Fixed Trusts Ltd. v Clyde Indus. Ltd. (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 33
(Austl.).
See Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 6, at 1269 (arguing that
69.
"institutional investors usually ... communicate with and actively seek to influence"
their portfolio companies, although Elhauge, relying on Version 3 of the common
ownership narrative, denies that this is a precondition to anticompetitive outcomes).
Note also that some anti-common ownership theorists rely on negative, rather than
positive, pressure by institutional investors-interpreting failure to pressure
management to compete aggressively as having an equivalent anticompetitive effect. See

Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership, supra note 39, at 5-6; Elhauge, New Evidence, supra
note 2, at 28-29 (stating that "reduction in pressure itself will likely have anticompetitive effects").
Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
70.
ComparativePerspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 21 (1991).
See generally Ian R. Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121
71.
J. FIN. EcoN. 111 (2016).
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competitive strategies of their portfolio firms, 72 they, nonetheless,
behave as active investors when they exercise rights attached to their
shares with respect to governance matters (such as nomination of
board members, executive compensation) and engage in dialogue with
management. 73
Indeed, large asset managers themselves reject the notion that
they are "passive." Vanguard has stated, for example, "[w]e believe
that our active engagement demonstrates that passive investors don't
need to be passive owners." 74 Similarly, BlackRock has criticized the
supposed dichotomy between active and passive shareholders as
superficial, suggesting that most traditional asset managers adopt an
approach midway between these two outer points. 7 5 Also, the majority
of index funds are not stand-alone funds. 76 Rather, they are part of
investment fund families, which will include active funds, and this may
provide index funds with incentives to improve the corporate
governance of a given company, in circumstances where that would
improve performance of the fund family as a whole. 77 Moreover, even
when index funds track a particular index, fund managers will have
some discretion in terms of the relative weighting they give to stock in
that index.7 8
Institutional investors have also stressed that, since they are
effectively locked into their investment for the long term, they need to
engage with the managers of the companies in which they invest. 79

72.
See, e.g., Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1557 (stating "[w]e do not mean to
suggest here that shareholders vote directly on competitive strategies"); see also
BLACKROCK, supra note 28, at 8; Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 47, at 9.
See, e.g., Azar et al., supra note 3 at 1553.
73.
5,
2020)
(last visited Feb.
74.
VANGUARD,
http://www.vanguard.com
[https://perma.cc/DC65-C8YL] (archived Mar. 16, 2020) (cited in Posner et al., supranote
1, at A29). See also Charles Stein, McNabb Says Firm is Not Passive on Governance,
BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 4,
2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0304/vanguard-s-menabb-says-firm-is-not-passive-on-governance

[https://perma.cc/5QWW-KPXU] (archived Feb. 10, 2020). Cf. Lund, supra note 46, at
497 (who makes a sharp distinction between institutional investors that adopt an active
corporate governance engagement strategy and "passive" index funds).
75.
See Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi, Engagement: The Missing Middle
Approach in the Bebchuk-Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUs. 385, 386 (2016);
BLACKROCK, supra note 28, at 8; Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 25; Fisch et al., supranote
27, at 48.
See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Index Funds and CorporateGovernance:
76.
Let Shareholders be Shareholders (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
18-39, 2019) (on file with SSRN).
77.
Id.
78.
See,
e.g.,
What
Affects
Index
Tracking,
VANGUARD,
https://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/advisor/etfcenter/article/ETF_IndexTrack
ing (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/T35F-T738] (archived Mar. 16, 2020).
79.
See Vanessa Desloires, BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street are Not Passive on
Corporate
Governance,
SYDNEY
MORNING
HERALD
(Nov.
1,
2016),
https://www.smh.com.au/business/markets/blackrock-vanguard-state-street-are-notpassive-on-corporate-governance-20161031-gseb74.html
[https:Hpermac/CAJ4-4SR3]
(archived Feb. 10, 2020).
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Under Version 1 of the common ownership narrative, increased
engagement in corporate governance by large institutional investors

reflects good corporate governance. 80 Under the more expansive
interpretation of Version 2, it is dangerous, in that it potentially
8 1
involves transmission of anticompetitive incentives to portfolio firms.
Version 3 of the common ownership narrative does a significant
pivot in terms of perspective. Unlike Version 2, which examines the
incentives and behavior of institutional investors, Version 3 instead
focuses solely on the incentives and behavior of corporate managers of
the investee firms, albeit under the shadow of institutional investor
power. In so doing, Version 3 eliminates the need to show any misuse
of share ownership rights by institutional investors; it is immaterial
whether investors are active or passive. Under Version 3, which might
be called "the mindreading model," it is sufficient that the corporate
managers of the portfolio firm are aware that common ownership exists
in their sector, on the basis that this awareness allows them to discern,
and follow, the presumed anticompetitive preferences of large
diversified investors.8 2 Adopting the mindreading model, some anticommon ownership scholars have predicted that managers who
correctly divine institutional investor preferences by "either conscious
83
calculation, intuition, or pure luck" will tend to be selected to run the
firm.8 4 In evolutionary terms, this would appear to be a variant of
natural selection. 85
Version 3 of the common ownership narrative goes substantially
further than Version 2. Under Version 3, the allegedly anticompetitive
86
deriving from the mere fact of
incentives are "purely structural,"
this version of the common
under
Indeed,
ownership.
common
all the financial interests are
that:
irrelevant
is
it
narrative,
ownership
87
investors have not
institutional
the
shareholdings
merely minority
ends; 8 8
anticompetitive
achieve
to
conduct
any
in
engaged
themselves
there has been no attempt by institutional investors to communicate

See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 25, at 2034
80.
See Azar et al., supra note 3 at 1560; Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership, supra
81.
note 39, at 5.
See, e.g., Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding,supra note 6, at 1270 (suggesting
82.
active communication is not necessary for common ownership to have anticompetitive
effects).
83. Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership, supra note 39, at 5.
Id.
84.
See, e.g., Emily Osterloff, What is Natural Selection?, NAT. HISTORY MUSEUM
85.
https-//www nhm.ac.uk/discover/what-is-natural-selection.html
2019),
18,
(Mar.
[https://perma.cc/HB7N-WDJA] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (describing "natural selection" as
an evolutionary mechanism by which "[o]rganisms that are more adapted to their
).
environment are more likely to survive ....
Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 6, at 1270; see also Elhauge,
86.
Growing Problem, supra note 17, at 2 (declaring that the problem of horizontal
shareholding is structural).
See generally Azar et al., supra note 3.
87.
Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 6, at 1270.
88.
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with, or influence, managers of the portfolio company; 8 9 and there is no
coordination or collusion between managers of competing companies. 90

According to Elhauge, who adopts Version 3 of the common
ownership narrative, where institutional investors own shares in
competing companies, those investors are liable under US antitrust
law if their pattern of ownership lessens competition, regardless of
whether they have undertaken any positive actions to contribute to
such an outcome. 91 This is a startling proposition. It is reminiscent of
Justice Louis Brandeis's comment more than a hundred years ago that
"[t]here is no such thing ... as an innocent stockholder. " 9 2

IV. THE THEORY OF COMMON OWNERSHIP FROM A CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE
The common ownership theory subverts many fundamental tenets
of contemporary corporate governance concerning the desirability of
increased shareholder engagement. Version 3 of the common
ownership narrative posits that mere ownership of shares by
institutional investors across concentrated industries can ipso facto
breach competition laws. This is a sufficiently disquieting proposition
as to warrant close scrutiny of the common ownership theory from a
corporate governance perspective. There are a number of points that

89.
See Elhauge, Antitrust Law, supra note 5, at 9 (arguing that shareholder
communications become irrelevant in lessening competition when incentives in
executive compensation achieve that aim); Elhauge, New Evidence, supra note 2, at 2
(horizontal shareholding/common ownership does not require communication between
shareholders and managers); see also Elhauge, Growing Problem, supra note 17, at 2
(arguing that anticompetitive effects of horizontal shareholding do not depend on
communication between managers); Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 6, at
1269 (stating anticompetitive effect does not require communication between managers
and shareholders). Elhauge notes, however, that communication by institutional
investors to managers, in fact, often occurs. Id. at 1269-70.
90.
See Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership, supra note 39, at 4-5 ("the fact that
concentrated ownership is related to higher prices for banking products need not be
driven by collusion, i.e., coordinated price-setting between banks."); Elhauge, Antitrust
Law, supra note 5, at 1-2 (stating that horizontal shareholding/common ownership does
not require coordination between managers of different companies); Elhauge, Horizontal
Shareholding, supra note 6, at 1269 (stating that horizontal shareholding does not
depend on managers coordinating with each other); see also Elhauge, GrowingProblem,
supra note 17, at 2 (stating anticompetitive effect does not depend on coordination
between managers); Elhauge, New Evidence, supra note 2, at 2 (horizontal
shareholding/common ownership does not require communication between managers of
different companies); Posner & Weyl, supra note 1 (arguing that there is no requirement
for managers to conspire with each other).
91.
See generally Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 6 (arguing that
stocks which create anticompetitive common ownership are illegal under current
antitrust law).
92.
Big CorporationsDangerous to Workers, Says Brandeis, READING EAGLE, Jan.
23, 1915, at 6.
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can be made about the common ownership theory, which suggest

possible weaknesses in its conclusions.
A. Common Ownership Is a Controversialand Broad-Brush Theory
In spite of its early academic impact, it is worth remembering that
theory-and that
the common ownership theory is just that-a
of common
effects
anticompetitive
theorizing about the possible
effects
those
that
prove
not
does
incentives
ownership on managerial
93
behavior
occur in practice. Nor does it prove that any anticompetitive
94
A recent empirical
which does exist is caused by common ownership.
95
provides data to
example,
for
study by Professor Erik Gilje, et al.,
assess the extent to which the theory represents reality, and its
findings suggest that in many instances, the empirical evidence does
96
not conform to theory in relation to common ownership.
Not only is the common ownership argument just a theory, it is
also a very broad-brush theory, which contains several puzzling
elements. For example, one curious aspect of the mindreading model,
Version 3 of the common ownership narrative, is why corporate
managers would, without any pressure or direction, act in the

interests of institutional investors with diversified
portfolios. Elhauge suggests that corporate managers might behave in
presumed

this way for a litany of possible reasons-"out of a sense of fiduciary
duty or gratitude, to gain support in future elections, to enhance future
job prospects, because executive compensation methods align with
shareholder interests, or so their shareholders will fend off takeover
Also, discerning institutional investors' presumed
threats."9 7
preferences under Version 3 will be no easy task. Those interests and
preferences are heterogeneous and constantly in flux, rendering the
assessment that corporate managers are required to make difficult and
98
prone to miscalculation.
Such far-reaching suppositions about the means by which
anticompetitive incentives might be transmitted from institutional
investors to corporate managers suggest the need for further empirical

See BLACKROCK, supra note 28, at 2, 6-7, 15 (arguing that some of the
93.
assumptions made in existing literature examining economics theory are based on
misconceptions of reality).
94.
Id.
See Erik P. Gilje et al., Who's Paying Attention? Measuring Common
95.
Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 25644, 2019) (doubting that common ownership significantly affects
managerial incentives).
96. Id.
Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding,supra note 6, at 1270.
97.
See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 47, at 4-5 (demonstrating the heterogeneity
98.
of the holdings of the largest shareholders).
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research, like the Gilje et al. study, 99 to bring greater clarity to the
investigation of whether corporate managers actually behave in this
way and, if they do, why this occurs and under what circumstances. A
growing number of studies have challenged
the empirical
underpinnings of the common ownership theory,1 00 and the
mechanisms, including executive remuneration, 1 0 1 which have been
suggested might provide the necessary conduit for transmission of
anticompetitive incentives to corporate management. 102

B. The Common Ownership Theory Includes Some Questionable
UnderlyingPresumptions
The common ownership argument also includes several
questionable presumptions in reaching its conclusion that corporate
managers will behave in an anticompetitive way. As already noted,
Version 2 of the common ownership narrative surmises that
institutional investors will exert anticompetitive pressure on corporate
managers of investee firms. Version 3 goes further, by suggesting that
institutional investors, including index funds, are so powerful that the
corporate managers will do their presumed bidding, even in the
absence of such pressure. Shareholder power and participation in
corporate governance in the United States has undoubtedly increased
in recent years,1 0 3 but are institutional investors as formidable as anticommon ownership scholars suggest?
Versions 2 and 3 of the common ownership narrative contradict
the traditional image of the institutional investor as passive 104 and a

99.
Gilje et al., supranote 95 (casting doubt on the theory that common ownership
significantly affects managerial incentives).
100. See, e.g., Patrick Dennis et al., Common Ownership Does Not Have AntiCompetitive Effects in the Airline Industry (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atl., Working Paper
2019-15, 2019) (arguing that correlation between high prices and common ownership is
caused by the endogenous market share component, rather than ownership): PAULINE
KENNEDY ET AL., THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP: ECONOMIC
FoUNDATIONS
AND
EMPIRIcAL
EVIDENcE
(2017),
https:/fpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3008331
[https://permacc/XNQ55Z4E] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (finding no evidence that common ownership raises airline
prices).
101. See generally David L Walker, Common Ownership and Executive Incentives:
The Implausibility of Compensation as an Anticompetitive Mechanism, 99 B.U. L. REV.
2373 (2019).
102. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The StrategiesofAnticompetitive
Common Ownership (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 423, 2018)
(arguing that most of the offered mechanisms are not supported empirically).
103. See generally Hill, Trajectory, supra note 65 (discussing evolving shareholder
governance rights acquired by private ordering).
104. See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 56, at 520, 567-70 (arguing
recent developments in institutional stock ownership and voting behavior make the

passivity story obsolete).
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"paper colossus,"1 05 since they presume high levels of institutional
investor influence. In fact, US shareholders have far fewer statutorily
than
rights
participatory
governance
corporate
guaranteed
United
the
including
jurisdictions,
law
common
in
other
shareholders
106
Also, recent studies highlight the fact that
Kingdom and Australia.
relatively limited resources towards
direct
investors
institutional
studies show that investment
These
monitoring.107
corporate
and actively managed, have
indexed
both
funds,
of
mutual
managers
on
stewardship,1 08 and to side
amounts
negligible
to
spend
incentives
09
These studies suggest
excessively with managers of corporations.1
to institutional
bending
managers
that, rather than corporate
investors' pressure (Version 2) or presumed preferences (Version 3),
institutional investors, in fact, generally follow the lead of the

corporate managers.1 0 Also, even when investors do flex their muscles
by, for example, seeking stronger governance rights, management
often responds by engaging in "private ordering combat,"111 to try to
12
modify or dilute the rights sought by shareholders.'

105. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:An
Agenda for InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 863 (1991).
106. See Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News
Corp.'s Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REv. 1 (2010) (explaining why News Corp.
moved from Australia to Delaware); Hill, Trajectory, supra note 65, at 514 (including
majority voting, convening shareholder meetings, and nominating and removing
directors).
107. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of InstitutionalInvestors,
31 J. EcON. PERSP. 89 (2017) (arguing that agency costs disincentivize fully investing in
stewardship of company); Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 25, at 2050 (arguing that index
fund managers have strong incentives to underinvest in stewardship); see also
Strampelli, supra note 65 (arguing that policy makers need to encourage index fund
managers and institutional investors to play a greater oversight role).

108. See Behchuk et al., supranote 107, at 100 (citing several companies that spent
negligible amounts on stewardship).
109. See id. at 96 (arguing agency costs disincentivize proxy fights with managers);
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 25 (arguing that index fund managers have strong
incentives to side with corporate managers); see also Lund, supra note 46. at 523-26
(discussing the rise of passive investing).
110. This conclusion accords with the findings of the Gilje, Gormley and Levit
study on the impact of index investing on managerial incentives. See Gilje et al., supra
note 95 (arguing that some investors do not pay much attention to the actions of
managers); see also Behchuk & Hirst, supra note 25; Lund supra note 46 at 512-13.
111. Hill, Trajectory, supra note 65, at 524-40.
112. See id. (demonstrating that managers changed the interpretation of
regulations and amended bylaws to weaken shareholder mechanisms of managerial
control).
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C. Recognition of the Link Between Concentrated Ownership and
Antitrust Law Is Not New
The references to common ownership by institutional investors as
a "blockbuster" discovery,1 13 and its description as the "great, but
mostly unknown, antitrust story of our time"1 1 4 suggest that the link
between the growing concentration of share ownership and antitrust
issues has only recently been uncovered. This is not, in fact, the case.
Corporate governance literature from the early 1990s onwards focused
on the implications of concentration of share ownership associated with
the rise of institutional investment.11 5 Buxbaum, for example,
highlighted the fact that a broadening of portfolio distribution was the
inevitable consequence of the absolute growth of institutional
investment pools,1 16 while Professor Bernard Black sought ways of
ensuring increased "institutionalvoice,""1 7 in accordance with Version

1 of the common ownership narrative discussed above.
These scholars also explicitly considered the growth in
concentrated
ownership
and portfolio diversification from a
competition law perspective.11 8 Yet, they concluded that antitrust law
constituted a very weak constraint on institutional investors. 1 9

Although Buxbaum acknowledged the theoretical possibility that
institutional investors could contravene antitrust laws, the potential
scenarios in which he thought this might occur went well beyond mere
common ownership, as envisaged under Version 3.120 Rather,
Buxbaum's examples involved coordinated forms of institutional
investor activism, 12 ' such as a targeted collective boycott against a

particular firm. 122 Black also considered this issue,1 2 3 and, like
Buxbaum, viewed the risk at that time to be "entirely theoretical," and
subject to countervailing factors that reduced the likelihood of
antitrust violations.1 2 4 The approach of Buxbaum and Black is

consistent with a narrow reading of Version

2 of the common

113. See Elauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 6, at 1283 (arguing that
antitrust enforcement has historically been lacking because the link between horizontal
shareholding and anticompetition issues has only recently been recognized).
114. Posner et al., supra note 1, at A29.
115. See also Partnoy, supra note 37 (tracing the origins of the common ownership
argument back to a 1984 paper by Julio Rotemberg).
116. Buxhaum, supranote 70, at 3.
117. Black, Agents Watching Agents, supranote 57, at 815-16.
118. See Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 57; Buxbaum, supra note 70.
119. Buxbaum, supra note 70, at 25.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 57, at 870-71.
124. Id.; see also Black, Shareholder Passivity; supra note 56, at 558-60
(describing several regulatory obstacles to antitrust violations)
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ownership narrative, which would require actual misuse of ownership
12 5
rights by institutional investors to achieve anticompetitive ends.
Professors Rock and Rubinfeld have addressed this issue more
recently and come to a similar conclusion. 126 Although acknowledging
that common ownership by institutional investors could in certain
circumstances have anticompetitive effects, Rock and Rubinfeld find
27
no persuasive evidence that this state of affairs currently exists.1
BlackRock has similarly criticized the common ownership theory as
based on "fragile evidence" in this regard. 128
D. Common Ownership Is a US-Centric and Industry-Specific Debate
Although the common ownership debate is now spreading around
the world, its origins are inherently US-centric in their focus on
particular American industries. Nonetheless, the market for capital is
now global and there are developments, both in the United States and
elsewhere in the world, which potentially affect that investment
ecosystem and the common ownership debate. For example, in recent
years there has been a striking reduction in the number of public
12 9
which has increased the importance
companies in the United States,
of global investment opportunities for US institutional investors.
American companies are not always competing with each other.
Indeed, they are not always competing with companies that have the
same governance structures, as is shown by the rise of Chinese State13 0
Whereas some of the industry clusters
Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

125. In the Australian competition law context, it is interesting to note that
amendments were introduced in November 2017, which prohibit "a concerted practice
that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening
competition"; Competition and Consumer Act § 45 (2010); see generally Nichols & Kayis,
supra note 10.
126. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 47 (suggesting that, in proposing guidelines
to prevent anticompetitive behavior, it is still important to protect investors' involvement
in corporate governance).
127. Id. Rock and Rubinfeld dismiss the common ownership argument, by stating,
"[w]e have considered the antitrust attack on widely diversified institutional investor
ownership, and found it lacking." Id. at 37.
128. BLACKROCK, supra note 28, at 2, 6-7; see also Hemphill & Kahan, supra note
102, at 46 (arguing that there is there is "no strong theoretical basis" for the assumptions
that underlie the common ownership theory).
129. See generally IRA M. MILLSTEIN CENTER FOR GLOBAL MARKETS AND
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AT A PUBLIc CROSSROADS: STUDYING THE
RAPIDLY EVOLVING WORLD OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (2019) (arguing that ownership
and control of companies has shifted from individuals in public markets to individuals
in private markets).
130. See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions:
Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697
(2013) (explaining the importance of SOEs for China's model of state capitalism). High
levels of state control are also found in a number of other jurisdictions, such as
Singapore. See, e.g., Luh Luh Lan & Umakanth Varottil, Shareholder Empowerment in
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considered in the common ownership literature, such as the banking
and the airline industries, may be US oligopolies, others, such as
technology and pharmaceutical sectors, are now global markets. Even
in concentrated industries, spillover effects in other industries and
other markets, in which highly diversified shareholders are invested,
will necessarily complicate any assessment of investor incentives.131
From a global investment perspective, it is interesting to examine
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (the Norwegian oil
fund),1 32 which is the world's largest sovereign wealth fund, with over
$1 trillion in assets.1 33 In 2015, the fund announced that it was moving
from passive investment to adopting an active owner stance. 1 34 It now
has stakes in over nine thousand companies in seventy three countries,
and owns an average of 1.4 percent of every company listed on any
stock market around the world.1 35 The Norwegian oil fund's record
breaking 2017 annual return of $131 billion 3 6 was largely attributable
to its broad investment strategy, coupled with the strong performance
of technology stocks in its global portfolio, including Apple and
Microsoft in the United States and Tencent in China.137

Controlled Companies: The

Case of

SHAREHOLDER POWER, supra note 20, at

Singapore, in

RESEARCH

HANDBOOK OF

572.

131. See, e.g., Madison Condon, Externalitiesand the Common Owner (N.YU. Law
& Econ. Working Paper No.19-07, 2019) (arguing that diversified investors should
rationally be motivated to internalize negative externalities within their portfolio);
Alessandro Romano, Horizontal Shareholding: The End of Markets and the Rise of
Networks (Working Paper, Sept. 2018) (proposing Network Sensitive Regulations to
analyze effects of diffuse institutional ownership).
132. The Norwegian oil fund is managed by Norges Bank Investment
Management, which is the asset management arm of Norway's central bank, Norges
Bank. About Us, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., https://www.nbim.no/en/organisation/aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) [https://perma.cc/WGU2-LBBM] (archived Feb. 4, 2020).
133. A Trillion Dollar Fund, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT, (Sept. 19, 2017),
https://www.nbim.no/en/transparency/news-list/2017/a-trillion-dollar-fund/
[https://perma.ce/JC54-T7RC] (archived Feb. 4, 2020).
134. Richard Milne, Norway Oil Fund Chief Jettisons Passivity, FIN. TIMES (Aug.
9,
2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/4ea976d0-26d6-11e5-9c4e-a775d2b173ca
[https://perma.cc/Y5TM-W32C] (archived Mar. 16, 2020).
135.

NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT,

GOVERNMENT

PENSION FUND

GLOBAL 28 (2018) [hereinafter NORGES BANK PENSION FUND];About Us, supra note 132.
136. Note, however, that in 2018 the Norwegian oil fund returned -6.1 percent, its
worst result since 2008, during the global financial crisis, as a result of financial
volatility. See Norway's Oil Fund Reports Worst Annual Results Since 2008, CENTRAL
BANKING (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.centralbanking.com/central-banks/sovereignwealth/4056801lnorways-oil-fund-reports-worst-annual-results-since-2008

[https://perma.cc/Z24W-NVK6] (archived Apr. 18, 2020); NORGES BANK PENSION FOND,
supra note 135 (explaining that year-to-year fluctuations are common).
137. Richard Milne, Norway Oil Fund Posts $131 Billion Return for 2017, FIN.
TIMES
(Feb.
27,
2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/48cec082-lbaO-1 e8-aaca4574d7dabfb [https://perma.cc/V5AL-N2TP] (archived Mar. 16, 2020); Eshe Nelson, How
Norway's Sovereign Wealth Fund Made $130 Billion Dollars in One Year, WORLD ECON.
FORUM (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/03/apple-tencent-andmicrosoft-how-norway-s-massive-oil-fund-made-130-billion-in-one-year
[https://perma.cc/2F3C-5U7C] (archived Feb. 4, 2020); see Mark Sweeney, Tencent, the
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As noted, the largest US institutional investors are also
increasingly involved in international markets. Although they tend to
have investments in far fewer companies than the Norwegian oil fund,
their investment levels are, on average, higher. For example, it is
estimated that BlackRock owns at least 5 percent of over 2,600
companies worldwide and Vanguard owns around the same level of

1,800 companies worldwide.1 38

The investment strategy of the Norwegian oil fund is based on the
39
objective of "maximising return with moderate risk."1 The kinds of
restrictions that are suggested by anti-common ownership scholars
would seriously undermine the investment strategies of US
institutional investors which, like the Norwegian oil fund, seek to use
broad portfolio diversification as a risk management tool.
E. Common Ownership in Megacompanies
Another problematic aspect of the common ownership hypothesis
its
focus on institutional investors, rather than on the rise in market
is
power of the investee firms themselves. If these firms have indeed
engaged in anticompetitive behavior, it might be thought that they
would be more obvious targets for competition law than their
shareholders.14 0 Yet, by targeting investment patterns, the common
ownership literature obscures the fact that the firms in some sectors,
such as the technology sector, have themselves become "powerful
megacompanies."14 1 This is reflected in Apple's 2018 market valuation
of $1 trillion,' 4 2 and in Senator Elizabeth Warren's proposal to break
43
up companies, such as Amazon, Facebook, and Google.1

$500bn Chinese Tech Firm You May Have Never Heard of, GUARIAN (Jan. 13, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/13/tencent-the-500bn-chinese-techfirm-you-may-never-have-heard-of [https://perma.cc/JKR9-9USX] (archived Feb. 4,
2020). The Norwegian Oil Fund's returns on its equity holdings were significantly
reduced in 2018, due to global political and trade instability. Katie Martin, Norway Oil
Fund Returns Narrowly Miss Benchmark in Second Quarter, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/9e081 c44-a519-1 1e8-926a-7342fe5e173f
[https://perma.ec/4NEL-6FPC] (archived Mar. 16, 2020).
138. Fichtner et al., supra note 24, at 312 tbl.2.
139. Letter from Oystein Olsen & Yngve Slyngstad, Norges Bank Investment
Management, to the Ministry of Finance, Investment Strategy for the Government
Pension Fund Global 1 (Nov. 16, 2017) (on file with Norges Bank Inv. Mgmt;).
140. Partnoy, supra note 37.
141. Matt Phillips, Apple's $1 Trillion Milestone Reflects Rise of Powerful
2018),
2,
(Aug.
TIMES
N.Y.
Megacompanies,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/business/apple-trillion.html
[https://perma.cc/9WG4-YGW2] (archived Feb. 4, 2020).
142. Id.
143. See David Smith, Elizabeth Warren Vows to Break Up Amazon, Facebook and
Google if Elected President, GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/mar/08/elizabeth-warren-amazon-faebook-google-big-tech-break-upblogpost [https://perma.ce/JQQ7-XA5J] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (explaining that Warren
wants to rein in the tech giants).
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Several recent studies have shown a dramatic increase in the size
and concentration levels of companies in some industries, including in
the banking sector and airlines sector, which feature so prominently in
the common ownership debate.' 44 For some economists, it is the
corporate consolidation and concentration of power in a small number
of megacompanies, rather than their capital structure, which has
created problems relating to wage inequality 4 5 and consumer
welfare.14 6 This suggests the possibility that the common ownership
theory may reflect correlation, rather than causation.1 4 7
The regulatory implications of this approach are that the law
should target the companies that engage in anticompetitive conduct,
rather than targeting institutional investors, by restricting their
ability to own shares in competing companies.1 48 A recent report of the
Australian Government
Productivity Commission
adopts this
approach in relation to Australia's extremely concentrated financial
sector.1 49 Acknowledging that these huge financial institutions "have
the ability to exercise market power over their competitors and
consumers,"'1 50
the
report
adopts
a
targeted
approach to

144. See, e.g., Gustavo Grullon et al., Are US Industries Becoming More
Concentrated?, 23 REV. FIN. 697 (2019) (finding that over seventy-five percent of
companies saw an increase in their concentration); see also Kathleen Kahle & Rene M.

Stulz, The Shrinking Number of Public Corporationsin the US, LONDON SCH. OF ECON.
& POL. SCI. US CENTRE (Oct. 21, 2017), http://bit.ly/2yWc6El [https://perma.cc/9YXQN7SG] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (noting the massive increase in market concentration in

the United States between 1975 and 2015, in which "the winners have done well"); IRA
M. MILLSTEIN CENTER, supranote 129 (highlighting the dramatic decline in the number
of public companies).
145. See Rachel Abrams, 7 Fast-FoodChains to End "No Poach"Deals that Lock
Down
Low
Wage
Workers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/business/fast-food-wages-no-poach-deal.html

&

[https://perma.cIHTE5-U4ED] (archived Feb. 22, 2020); see also Alan B. Krueger
Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the FranchiseSector
(Working
Paper,
2017).
http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/SI2017/LS/KruegerAshenfelter pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VBM-NNKX] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (examining use of market power
and collusive actions by employers to suppress wages and restrict competition).
146. See Grullon et al., supra note 144 (explaining that firms enjoy higher profit
margins, but it is unclear whether consumers benefit from higher quality products).
147. See BLACKROCK, supra note 28, at 2 (arguing that the common ownership
research in the economics literature does not provide a "plausible causal explanation of
how common ownership can lead to higher prices"); see also id. at 6-7, 15.
148. See, e.g., Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 145, at 2-3.
149. See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, COMPETITION IN
THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT:
OVERVIEW & RECOMMENDATIONS, No. 89 (2018) (recommending fostering and protecting
competition to improve consumer outcomes, enhance the productivity and international
competitiveness of the financial system and the broader economy, and support ongoing
innovation).
150. Id. at 2.
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anticompetitive conduct by such firms that may exploit their
customers.151
In an era of megacompanies, the presence of large powerful
institutional investors as a counterweight is not necessarily an
undesirable corporate governance development.
F. Investee Firm Managers and Their FiduciaryDuties
The common ownership theory not only diverts attention from
potentially anticompetitive conduct of portfolio companies themselves,
but it also diverts attention from the conduct of directors and officers
of those firms.1 52 As Commissioner Hayne stressed in Australia's
153
directors and
recent high profile Banking Royal Commission,
of their
benefit
the
for
duties
their
officers are required to exercise
financial
merely
corporation, which involves more than considering
154
Furthermore, Commissioner Hayne
returns to shareholders.
disputed the idea that the interests of shareholders and customers are
opposed, 155 noting that the interests of both groups will generally
converge when directors and officers act in the long-term financial best

interests of the corporation. 156
The Banking Royal Commission's Final Report took the view that,
in addition to the banks themselves, their boards and senior managers
bore responsibility for misconduct, which enhanced corporate profits
by exploiting customers. 157 This raises the possibility that corporate
managers could themselves be liable for breach of either the duty of
care or the duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the company

as a whole. Although liability for breach of the duty of care is unlikely

151. See James Frost, Productivity Commission's Final Report Lashes Banks for
2018),
(Aug.
3,
FIN.
REV.
AUsTL.
Customers,
Exploiting
https://www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/productivity-commissions-final7
3
report-lashes-hanks-for-exploiting-customers-2018080 -h13in
[https://pcrma.cc/YNW5-Z6WJ] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (recommending appointing a
Principal Integrity Officer to oversee banks); AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT PRODUcTIVITY
COMMISsION, supra note 149, at 2, 16-17, 24-25, 45, 53 (explaining that targeted
approach includes the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and
mandating a Principal Integrity Officer for all banks). As the report notes, an extremely
profitable financial system is "not necessarily a bad thing," provided it is "workably
competitive." Id. at 12.
152. See Daniel P. O'Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common
Ownership: We Know Less Than We T'hink, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 765-66 (discussing
the role of directors' and officers' fiduciary duties in the context of the common ownership
debate); AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, supra note 149, at 2,
24-25, 45 (recommending Principal Integrity Officers in parent financial entities).
153. ROYAL COMMIsSION INTO MISCONDUCT IN THE BANKING, SUPERANNUATION
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRL. (2019).
154. Id. at 402.
155. Id. at 403.

156. Id.
157. Id. at 4.
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under US corporate law, 15 8 due to the capacious protection offered by
the business judgment rule and exculpatory clauses, directors and

officers face a much greater risk of liability under Australian law.15 9 It
is, therefore, arguable that if, under Version 2 or Version 3 of the
common ownership narrative, directors and managers of investee firms
engaged in anticompetitive conduct (based on the actual or presumed
preferences of a segment of the body of shareholders), those directors
and officers would breach their statutory duties to the company under
Australian law. 160
G. InstitutionalInvestors and the Growing Importance of ESG
The common ownership theory is focused almost exclusively on
the goal of profit maximization.1 6 1 It arguably ignores one of the most
important
developments
in
current
international
corporate
governance, namely the growing importance of environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) factors. 6 2 Large institutional investors
increasingly view a diverse range of ESG factors, such as climate

158. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch.,
1996) (limiting director liability for oversight failure). But see Marchand v. Barnhill, 212
A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) (plaintiffs successfully pleaded that the directors were not protected
under the Caremark doctrine).
159. This is due to the availability of "stepping stone" liability under Australian
law, whereby directors and officers may be personally liable for failure to prevent
contraventions of the law by their corporation. See, e.g., Abe Herzberg & Helen Anderson,
Stepping Stones-From CorporateFault to Directors'PersonalCivil Liability, 40 FED. L.
REV. 181 (2012) (arguing that by exposing their company to legal or reputational
damage, directors violate their statutory duty of care); Tim Bednall & Pamela Hanrahan,
Officers'Liabilityfor MandatoryCorporate Disclosure:Two Paths, Two Destinations?, 31
COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 474 (2013); Alice Zhou, A Step Too Far?Rethinking the Stepping
Stone Approach to Officers' Liability, 47 FED. L. REV. 151 (2019).
160. These statutory duties are primarily enforceable by the Australian securities
regulator, ASIC. For a comparison of enforcement of directors' duties under US and
Australian law, see Renee Jones & Michelle Welsh, Toward a Public Enforcement Model
for Directors'Dutyof Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 343 (2012).
161. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Corporations, Directors' Duties and the
Public/PrivateDivide, in FIRM GOVERNANCE: THE ANATOMY OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONs
IN BUsINEsS (Arthur Laby & Jacob Russell eds., 2020) (arguing that corporate financial
performance is only one of multiple problems in corporate law and that an equally
important problem is the danger that corporate conduct may result in negative
externalities and harm to society).
162. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, supra note 28, at 8-9 (stating many managers are
beginning to emphasize ESG factors.)
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165
as
change, 163 sustainability,1 64 and gender diversity on boards,

inherent aspects of risk management, and these issues now account for
1 66
the majority of all shareholder proposals filed in the United States.
Also, a growing number of international Shareholder Stewardship
Codes explicitly refer to investor stewardship responsibilities
regarding ESG.1 6 7 For example, the 2020 UK Shareholder Stewardship
Code for the first time explicitly recognizes the growing importance of

ESG matters to institutional investors.16 8
One recent paper effectively flips the central argument of anticommon ownership scholars on its head, by arguing that portfolioregarding intervention by the largest institutional investors may have
69
The paper
beneficial outcomes from a social welfare perspective.1
argues that large diversified investors are, indeed, sometimes prepared
to exert their growing power over individual firms for the benefit of
their portfolio companies, but that, rather than seeking to reduce
competition, they do this to control the effects of firm-level negative
70
This
externalities of climate change on their entire portfolio.'
3 of
2
and
Versions
profit-focused
the
only
development contradicts not
171
narrative.
investor
the
lazy
common ownership but also Version 1,

163. See, e.g., Larry Fink's 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping of
(last
Finance, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/nolprivat/larry-fink-ceo-letter
visited Mar. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YGG2-V42S] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (urging
CEOs to take climate change into account when handling investments); Heather Landy,
A $ 7 Tillion Wall Street Powerhouse is Finally Matching its Climate-ChangeRhetoric
with Action, QUARTZ (Jan. 14, 2020), https://qz.com/1784949/blackrock-ceo-larry-finks[https://perma.cc/KLG8-5RVY]
2020 -etter-backs-up-climate-rhetoric-with-action/
(archived Feb. 22, 2020) (discussing BlackRock's proposed exit from investments in coal
producers and search for more sustainable investments).
164. See, e.g., Larry Fink's 2020 Letter to CEOs, supra note 163; Landy, supra note
163 (discussing BlackRock's proposed exit from investments in coal producers and search
for more sustainable investments).

165. See, e.g., Janet Albrechtsen & Andrew White, Chris Corrigan Attacks
Business Gender Targets, AUSTRALIAN Bus. REV. (May 19, 2018).
166. Shirley Westcott, 2019 Proxy Season Preview, ALLIANCE ADVISoRS 1 (Apr.
https://allianceadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Alliance-Advisors2019),
[https://perma.cc/U832-W38T]
Newsletter-Apr.-2019-2019-Proxy-Season-Preview.pdf
(archived Feb. 4, 2020).
167. See Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Role of International
Stewardship Codes, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497 (looking at stewardship codes to examine
the positive activist role of shareholders).
168. See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 2020, at 2,
15 (2020) (Principle 7 requires signatories to report any ESG initiatives).
169. See Condon, supra note 131 (arguing that institutional investors have become
more willing to advertise their role in seeking emissions reductions commitments).
170. See id. (arguing that diversified investors should rationally be motivated to
internalize negative externalities within their portfolio).
171. See id. (arguing that institutional investors can influence decisions at the firm
level to benefit their portfolio, challenging the rationally reticent model of investors).
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V. CONCLUSION
Anti-common ownership scholars propose an intriguing theory,
but further empirical studies are required to determine whether it
accords with reality. The regulatory prescriptions offered by the more
extreme versions of the common ownership narrative would have dire

regulatory consequences and result in wholesale discrimination
against certain shareholders. They would effectively unravel the
benefits

of

investment

diversification

and

democratization

of

wealth.' 72 If further studies determine that there are indeed "hidden
costs" 7 3 to common ownership, the role of the law should be to craft an
effective, but appropriately targeted, response to that problem.

172.

See BLACKROCK, supra note 28, at 1 (explaining that remedies for common
negatively affect diversified investment strategies and index

ownership would

investing).
173. Partnoy, supra note 37.

